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Abstract
The paper analyses and compares the role that the tightening in liquidity conditions
and the collapse in risk appetite played for the global transmission of the nancial crisis.
Dealing with identication and the large dimensionality of the empirical exercise with a
Global VAR approach, the ndings highlight the diversity of the transmission process.
While liquidity shocks have had a more severe impact on advanced economies, it was
mainly the decline in risk appetite that aected emerging market economies. The tight-
ening of nancial conditions was a key transmission channel for advanced economies,
whereas for emerging markets it was mainly the real side of the economy that suered.
Moreover, there are some striking dierences also within types of economies, with Eu-
rope being more adversely aected by the fall in risk appetite than other advanced
economies.
JEL Classication: E44, F3, C5.
Keywords: Liquidity, risk, nancial crisis, global transmission, global VAR (GVAR),
shocks, modelling, US, advanced economies, emerging market economies.5
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Non-technical summary
O n er e m a r k a b l ef e a t u r eo ft h ec u r r e n tnancial crisis has been the speed and apparent
synchronicity with which it has spread around the globe. While it originated in the United
States, it has aected not only economies that shared similar vulnerabilities, in particular
t h ee x p o s u r eo fnancial institutions to toxic assets, but it spread to virtually all economies,
advanced and emerging alike. Die r e n th y p o t h e s e sh a v eb e e np u tf o r w a r da st ow h yt h e
crisis has become truly global in reach. A rst hypothesis is that of liquidity, and the fact
that credit markets and in particular interbank markets became highly illiquid, leading to
the collapse or near-collapse of numerous nancial institutions and severely curtailing the
capital available to the real side of the economy (e.g. Adrian and Shin (2010), Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), Borio (2009), Tirole (2010)).
A second hypothesis relates to the pricing of risk. While nancial institutions in North
America and Europe were highly leveraged and exposed, nancial institutions in many EMEs,
in particular in Asia and Latin America were not. Moreover, the nancial crisis triggered
a massive reversal of private capital  ows globally - or what has been dubbed a " ight
to safety" phenomenon - with capital exiting in particular EMEs and being shifted from
relatively risky nancial assets into safer assets such as US treasuries. Such a reallocation
of global capital related to a re-pricing of risk may thus have spread the crisis, and even to
countries and regions that had been less exposed through the liquidity channel.
The paper sets out to explore the role of these two dierent mechanisms in spreading
the crisis, both to advanced economies and to emerging markets. Specically, we focus on
US-specic shocks to liquidity (using the US TED spread between US short-term money
market rates and US treasuries) and US shocks to risk appetite (the US VIX index of
implied volatility of the S&P500). Using a Global VAR (GVAR) approach, this enables us
to trace the eect of these two types of shocks to a broad set of 26 economies worldwide.
The empirical approach we employ allows us to deal with the challenge of identication
and in particular with the large dimensionality problem. We resort to a novel methodology
introduced by Chudik and Pesaran (2010) (so-called innite-dimensional VARs), in which
all variables are treated as endogenous, which is arguably a very important advantage for
our purpose. Restrictions to overcome the dimensionality problem are based on an intuitive
concept, namely that of neighborhood eects.
The paper highlights four key ndings. The rst set of empirical results focuses on the
global transmission of shocks and the question what type of shock made the nancial crisis
truly global. The short answer is that both types of shocks - liquidity shocks and risk shocks
- have mattered during the crisis. However, these shocks have had strikingly diverse eects
on dierent sets of countries and on dierent market segments. First, advanced countries6
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were more strongly aected by US liquidity shocks than EMEs. In fact, the decline in equity
markets and the tightening in nancial market conditions in response to a US liquidity
shock in many advanced countries was even stronger than that in the US itself. Second, by
contrast, EMEs have been vulnerable mainly to risk shocks, and comparably less so to US
liquidity shocks. A third key nding is that in advanced economies it has been mainly the
nancing conditions that have been adversely aected by US-specic shocks, while in EMEs
it is rather the real side of the economy that exhibited the greatest sensitivity to US shocks.
Fourth, there are some intriguing dierences also among advanced economies and among
EMEs in their response pattern. Among advanced economies, it has been in particular
Europe that has seen the highest exposure to US shocks, and in particular to shocks to
risk appetite. By contrast, most advanced economies seem to have been aected to a similar
degree by US liquidity shocks. Among EMEs, shocks to risk appetite have had larger negative
eects on economies in Latin America and in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. By
contrast, it has been in particular emerging economies in Asia that have been more severely
aected by US liquidity shocks, compared to other EMEs.
These ndings thus paint a striking picture of the global transmission of the crisis, and
also highlight some crucial dierences in the way the crisis spread. To some extent, the
empirical results conrm some of our priors discussed above: EMEs were less aected by
liquidity shocks, presumably as they had relatively more sound nancial systems. Yet they
were more strongly impacted by shocks to risk appetite, which may in part be due to the
greater exposure of EMEs and the traditional pricing of EME nancial assets as being
relatively risky, as emphasised by a broad literature e.g. on EME sovereign debt crises.
Among EME regions, Asia appears to have been relatively more sensitive to US liquidity
conditions than other EMEs, which may in part stem from the fact Asia has a greater
nancial dependence on the US, while Emerging Europe is more closely tied to developments
i nt h ee u r oa r e aa n di nt h eU K .7
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1 Introduction
One remarkable feature of the current nancial crisis has been the speed and apparent
synchronicity with which it has spread around the globe. While it originated in the United
States, it has aected not only economies that shared similar vulnerabilities, in particular
t h ee x p o s u r eo fnancial institutions to toxic assets, but it spread to virtually all economies,
advanced and emerging alike. Moreover, the crisis has not been limited to the sphere of
nancial markets but has had a major impact on real economic activity, inducing the largest
global recession since the Great Depression. Even after an initial de-coupling of emerging
market economies (EMEs), global economic activity became temporarily highly synchronized
in the second half of 2008 and the rst half of 2009.
Dierent hypotheses have been put forward as to why the crisis has become truly global
in reach. A r s th y p o t h e s i si st h a to fl i q u i d i t y ,a n dt h ef a c tt h a tc r e d i tm a r k e t sa n di n
particular interbank markets became highly illiquid, leading to the collapse or near-collapse
of numerous nancial institutions and severely reducing the capital available to the real side
of the economy (e.g. Adrian and Shin (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Borio
(2009), Tirole (2010)). A second hypothesis relates to the pricing of risk. While nancial
institutions in North America and Europe were highly leveraged and exposed, nancial
institutions in many EMEs, in particular in Asia and Latin America were not. Moreover,
the nancial crisis triggered a massive reversal of private capital  ows globally - or what has
been dubbed a " ight to safety" phenomenon - with capital exiting in particular EMEs and
being shifted from relatively risky nancial assets into safer assets such as US treasuries.
Such a reallocation of global capital related to a re-pricing of risk may thus have spread the
crisis, and even to countries and regions that had been less exposed through the liquidity
channel.
The paper sets out to explore the role of these two dierent mechanisms in spreading
the crisis, both to advanced economies and to emerging markets. What complicates such an
analysis using standard macro models is that the crisis comprises a relatively short period
and that it is inherently di!cult to identify meaningful measures of shocks to liquidity
and to risk appetite at quarterly or monthly frequency. We tackle this issue by taking a
nancial market perspective, analyzing the response of short-term interest rates as a proxy
for nancial market conditions, and the response of equity markets as a proxy for the impact
on the real economy. Using weekly data allows us to identify these two types of US-specic
shocks: shocks to liquidity (using the US TED spread between US short-term money market
rates and US treasuries) and shocks to risk appetite (the US VIX index of implied volatility
of the S&P500) Using a Global VAR (GVAR) approach, this enables us to trace the eect
of these two types of shocks to a broad set of 26 economies worldwide.8
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The empirical approach we employ allows us to deal with the challenge of identication
and in particular with the large dimensionality problem. We resort to a novel methodology
introduced by Chudik and Pesaran (2010) and later extended by Pesaran and Chudik (2010)
in the context of the analysis of VARs of growing dimensions (so-called innite-dimensional
VARs), a methodology which also establishes conditions under which the increasingly used
Global VAR model developed by Pesaran et al. (2004) is applicable. In this set-up, all
variables are treated as endogenous, which is arguably a very important advantage for our
purpose. Restrictions to overcome the dimensionality problem are based on an intuitive
concept, namely that of neighborhood eects. The restrictions employed in this paper allow
for rich spatial and temporal interactions among variables. In particular, we allow for the US
to potentially have a dominant in uence on other countries, other sources of strong cross-
section dependencies besides the dominant US variables (i.e. we allow for the presence of
unobserved strong common factors), and an unspecied weak-form cross-section dependence
of residuals (see Chudik, Pesaran, and Tosetti (2010) for denition of weak and strong
cross section dependence). The dominance of the US in nancial markets also helps us
distinguish US shocks from shocks to other economies. To distinguish between dierent
types of US shocks and to separate them from other global shocks, we implement a standard
sign restriction approach combined with a partial ordering of variables in the context of our
high-dimensional VARs.
The paper highlights four key ndings, based on variance decompositions as well as
Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) for the dierent shocks. The rst set of
empirical results focuses on the global transmission of shocks and the question what type of
shock made the nancial crisis truly global. The short answer is that both types of shocks -
liquidity shocks and risk shocks - have mattered during the crisis. However, these shocks have
had strikingly diverse eects on dierent sets of countries and on die r e n tm a r k e ts e g m e n t s .
First, advanced countries were more strongly aected by US liquidity shocks than EMEs.
In fact, the decline in equity markets and the tightening in nancial market conditions in
response to a US liquidity shock in many advanced countries was even stronger than that
in the US itself. Second, by contrast, EMEs have been relatively more vulnerable mainly to
risk shocks, and comparably somewhat less so to US liquidity shocks. This is most strongly
the case for equity market responses to the various shocks. A third key nding is that in
advanced economies it has been mainly the nancing conditions that have been adversely
aected by US-specic shocks, while in EMEs it is rather the real side of the economy that
exhibited a comparatively greater sensitivity to US shocks. We emphasize that these are
generalized patterns we observe, while there is clearly a lot of heterogeneity in the ndings.
Fourth, there are some intriguing dierences also among advanced economies and among9
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EMEs in their response pattern. Among advanced economies, it has been in particular
Europe that has seen the highest exposure to US shocks, and in particular to shocks to
risk appetite. By contrast, most advanced economies seem to have been aected to a similar
degree by US liquidity shocks. Among EMEs, shocks to risk appetite have had larger negative
eects on economies in Latin America and in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. By
contrast, it has been in particular emerging economies in Asia that have been more severely
aected by US liquidity shocks, compared to other EMEs.
These ndings thus paint a striking picture of the global transmission of the crisis, and
also highlight some crucial dierences in the way the crisis spread. To some extent, the
empirical results conrm some of our priors discussed above: EMEs were comparatively less
aected by liquidity shocks, presumably as they had relatively more sound nancial systems
than advanced economies. Yet they were more strongly impacted by shocks to risk appetite,
which may in part be due to the traditional pricing of EME nancial assets as being relatively
risky, as emphasized by a broad literature e.g. on EME sovereign debt crises. Among EME
regions, Asia appears to have been relatively more sensitive to US liquidity conditions than
other EMEs, which may in part stem from the fact Asia has a greater nancial dependence
on the US, while Emerging Europe is more closely tied to developments in the euro area and
in the UK.
From the outset we stress a number of limitations and caveats of our approach. A key
c h a l l e n g ew ef a c ei st h ei d e n t i cation of shocks and how to trace them in a very large system
of 26 economies and dierent markets. We argue that the GVAR approach we use can deal
well both with identication and with the dimensionality problem. Yet, our identication is
limited to two types of shocks - to liquidity and to risk appetite - which are all US-specici n
nature. However, the crisis dynamics was a lot more complex and many more types of shocks
were involved. For instance, one type of shock we are not identifying is that to condence,
e.g. as triggered by the collapse of nancial institutions such as Lehman Brothers or AIG,
and which has been argued by many to have severely exacerbated the crisis. Moreover,
while the US may have been the origin of the crisis, shocks subsequently originating in many
other economies have also played a role in the crisis dynamics. Yet we do not and do not
even attempt to identify such shocks. Our approach to analyzing the crisis dynamics and its
drivers is necessarily simplied; however, we argue that it captures the central features of the
crisis, and the analysis of these features - liquidity and risk - is important for understanding
the global transmission of the crisis.1
The paper is related to three strands of the literature. A rst strand has been focusing
1We also note that the use of weekly data frequency, both for identication reasons as well as given the
relatively short length of the crisis, prevents us from extending the paper to the analysis of real eects of
liquidity and risk shocks, such as on GDP and its components; leaving such an analysis for future research.10
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specically on the origin and the transmission of the current nancial crisis. Much of this
work has concentrated on the domestic economy, specically the US and its policy responses
(e.g. Calomiris (2008), Taylor (2009)). On the international dimension of the crisis, Tong
and Wei (2009) investigate whether the degree of nancial constraints explains the eect of
the crisis on foreign rms. The IMF (2009) analyses the transmission of nancial stress from
advanced to emerging economies, Fratzscher (2009) investigates the global transmission of
US shocks to FX markets for a broad set of advanced and emerging market economies, while
Bekaert et al. (2010) analyze and refute the presence of cross-border contagion in global
equity markets during the crisis. By contrast, there is a large and prominent literature on
the global transmission of past nancial crises, with a strong interest in the role of contagion
and related channels (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005); Bae
et al. (2003), Karolyi (2003), De Gregorio and Valdes (2001), Dungey et al. (2004)).
The second strand of the literature is on the international nancial market transmission
of shocks. Much of this literature on international spillovers has focused on individual asset
prices in isolation, for instance on equity markets. Early empirical work that has shaped
this literature is Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990) and Engle, Ito, and Lin (1990) on the
spillovers from the US to the Japanese and UK equity markets. More recent examples are
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), who develop a spillover index based on VAR models, and show
that the evolution of return and volatility spillovers across 19 stock markets is strikingly
dierent. Dungey and Martin (2007) study contagion across dierent countries and nancial
markets, analyzing mainly the transmission of volatility across markets, while the ndings of
Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon (2010) highlight that the transmission of nancial market
shocks often occurs not only within asset classes but also across assets internationally.
R e l a t e dw o r ko ni n t e r n a t i o n a lnancial co-movements attempts to explain the evolution
of nancial spillovers through real and nancial linkages of the underlying economies and on
contagion in international markets. Focusing on mature economies, Forbes and Chinn (2004)
nd that the country-specic factors have become somewhat less important and bilateral
trade and nancial linkages are nowadays more important factors for explaining international
spillovers across equity and bond markets. A related literature focuses on the eects of
macroeconomic announcements on various asset prices. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and
Vega (2003) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) look at the eect of macro announcements
on high-frequency asset returns across several asset prices, such as exchange rates, interest
rates and the yield curve, conrming the importance of news and in some cases nding a
signicant response of risk premia or an overshooting of asset prices.
As a third strand, the methodological approach of the paper links to the literature focus-
ing on GVAR models. The framework for modelling international linkages known as GVAR11
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was proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004). Since then, it has been developed further and used
in various applications. For example, Pesaran et al. (2006) and Pesaran, Schuermann, and
Treutler (2007) analyzed credit risk. An extended and updated version of the GVAR by
Dées et al. (2007) treats the euro area as a single unit, and has been used by Pesaran,
Smith, and Smith (2007) to evaluate a potential entry by the UK and Sweden into the euro.
Chudik (2008) extends the GVAR approach by allowing for a global dominance of the US.
Methodological foundations for the speciﬁcation of individual country models were devel-
oped recently by Chudik and Pesaran (2010) and later extended by Pesaran and Chudik
(2010) to allow for dominant units. We follow the latter two papers to specify our country
models, allowing for rich spatio-temporal linkages among economies. There are two main
alternative ways to the GVAR approach for dealing with the dimensionality problem in the
literature: factor models and restrictions on parameter space in form of Bayesian priors, see
for instance Stock and Watson (2005), Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) or Canova and
Ciccarelli (2009) for recent applications.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical methodology and
identiﬁcation of shocks to liquidity and to risk. It also brieﬂy describes the underlying data
and several measurement issues. The main empirical ﬁndings of the paper on the global
transmission of the shocks are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l l i n g o f ﬁnancial and economic variables with a
global perspective
This section presents the empirical methodology through which we analyze the transmission
of shocks in a large system with a large set of countries (section 2.1). Subsequently, the
section explains several issues related to the identiﬁcation of the underlying shocks to liquidity
and to risk (section 2.2) and the data employed (section 2.3).
2.1 The model
Let xit denote a vector of ki domestic variables of country i in period t. We treat all (domestic
and foreign) variables as jointly determined and we suppose that the vector of k =
PN
i=1 ki
variables, xt =( x0
1t,...,x0
Nt)
0, is given by the following high dimensional factor-augmented
VAR model,
xt = Φxt−1 + Γft + ut,a n dut = Rεt,( 1 )
where Φ is a large k × k matrix of coeﬃcients, ut =( u0
1t,...,u0
Nt)
0 is an k × 1 vector of
reduced form errors, ft is m × 1 vector of (strong) unobserved common factors, and Γ is12
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the corresponding n × p matrix of factor loadings. We abstract here in the notation from
higher-order lags or deterministic terms to keep the exposition simple. Without a loss of
generality, we denote the US as country l =1throughout the paper. Our set of endogenous
variables is:
x1w =( l1w>u 1w>yl{ w>whg w)
0 ,
for the US economy, and
{lw =( llw>u lw)
0 , l =2 >3>===>Q,
for the remaining economies, where llw denotes the rst dierence in short term interest rates
(in country l and period w), ulw denotes stock market returns, yl{w is the rst dierence in the
log of the VIX index, whgw is the rst dierence of the US TED spread between US short-term
money market rates and US treasuries. Thus n1 =4and nl =2for lA1.W e d e ne the












where ¯ ~w and ¯ uw are cross-section averages of the (non-US) rst dierences in interest rates
and (non-US) stock market returns, respectively.






lfw + ulw,( 2 )
where we have partitioned matrix x =[xlm] into nl × nm submatrices xlm,a n dw eh a v e
partitioned K =[ Kl] into nl ×p submatrices Kl.C o u n t r y - s p e c i c equation (2) constitutes a
rich specication, but it cannot be estimated due to the well-known curse of dimensionality.
In our set-up, both Q and W are relatively large, and the number of parameters in (1) grows
at a quadratic rate with Q. Some restrictions are therefore inevitable and we follow the
approach developed by Chudik and Pesaran (2010), later extended by Pesaran and Chudik
(2010), to deal with the dimensionality problem, while at the same time allowing for a rich









where xl =[ xl1>xl2>===>xlQ]
0, xdl =[ xdl1>==>xdlQ]
0 captures the so-called neighborhood
eects, and xel =[ xel1>==>xelQ]
0 captures the non-neighborhood eects.2 The elements of
2el could arise for instance also from missspecications of the spatial weights matrices.13
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where k=k" denotes the maximum absolute row-sum matrix norm and constant N?4 does
not depend on Q. But note that the aggregate impact of non-neighbors, namely x0
elxw31 =
PQ
m=1 xelmxm>w31, is in general not negligible and as shown in Chudik and Pesaran (2010) it
depends on the strengths of cross-section dependence among variables. Furthermore, we
suppose that the matrix xdl c a nb ew r i t t e na s
xdl = SlDl,( 5 )
where Dl is gl × nl matrix of unknown coe!cients to be estimated for country l,a n dt h e
n × gl linkage matrix Sl composes of trade and nancial weights, and it also allows for the










in which the n × nl selection matrix El selects country l variables from the vector xw, i.e.
E0
lxw = xlw for all l,a n dWd
l for d 5 {Wu>Il} are n × 2 spatial-weights matrices that de-
ne country-specic (local) spatial averages of foreign variables. Two weighting schemes are
considered: trade weights (indexed by Wu)a n dnancial weights (indexed by Il). In this








¢0, i.e. the neighbors of country l are the US (dom-
inant unit), its own past, country-specic trade-weighted spatial averages ¯ xWu
zlw = WWu0
l xw,
and country-specic nancial-weighted spatial averages ¯ xIl
zlw = WIl0
l xw. The dominance of
the US is also re ected in the assumption about the matrix R, which fully characterizes
the contemporaneous correlations among the reduced-form errors uw. In contrast to what is
common in the factor-model literature, see for instance Forni and Lippi (2001), Forni et al.
(2000) and Forni et al. (2004), we allow for strong cross-section dependence in uw to re ect
the potential dominance of the US. We partition R =[R1>R31],w h e r eR1 denotes the rst
n1 columns of R, and we assume that
kR1k1 = R(Q), kR31k" ?N,a n dkR31k1 ?N ,
where k=k1 denotes the maximum absolute column sum matrix norm. The unbounded col-
umn norm of R1 essentially allows for the dominance of the US, and it also implies strong
cross-section dependence in uw. Bounded row and column norms of R31,i m p l yt h a to n c e
conditioned on the dominant US shocks (and the unobserved strong factors in fw), the inno-14
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vations R31%w are weakly cross sectionally dependent. We do not specify the exact form of
R31, but we note that this includes all commonly used spatial models in the literature, c.f.
Pesaran and Tosetti (2010).
The analysis of innite-dimensional VARs by Peseran and Chudik implies that under
the limiting restrictions spelled out above, under p  2 and under additional regularity
requirements that ensure stability of the system as Q>W
m
$4 ,i n nite-dimensional model
(1) can be arbitrarily well characterized (as Q $4 ) by the following country-specic nite
dimensional models, which can be consistently estimated separately on country-by-country
basis. Variables of dominant unit have to be jointly considered together with granular cross
















where zw =( x0
1w>x0
w)







It should be noted that the dominant (US) variables become eectively dynamic common
factors for the remaining variables (c.f. Pesaran and Chudik (2010)) and because of this u1w
and fw are not identied, only reduced-form errors w are.
For countries l =2 >3>===>Q, the following conditional models can be consistently esti-
mated


















where elw = E0
lR31%w. Note that although elw are (weakly) cross sectionally dependent,
they are serially uncorrelated and orthogonal (in a limit as Q $4 ) with contemporaneous
variables in zw. We are a bit more general on the structure of the model, allowing for dierent
types of inter-linkages, and as a result we restrict the number of lags in the empirical analysis
below to one, and we estimate the coe!cients of the marginal US model and the conditional
non-US country models by using Ridge regression.
In order to analyze cross-country linkages, spillovers and to perform simulations, the
estimated country models have to be solved in one system, as it is custom in the GVAR
literature. We depart slightly from other GVAR papers by allowing for a factor structure in
the solved global system, re ecting the presence of global shocks in w.S u b s t i t u t e( 6 )i n t o15
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for i =2 ,3,...,N,w h e r e





i + Ci0B1 W
a0
1 )+( Ci  + Ci0A )W
0
z,
and Wz is implicitly deﬁned by relation zt = W0
zxt. Note that the US innovations u1t and
innovations in ft eﬀectively enter as a common factor in country models through ξt. Finally,
models in (8) and equation for x1t from marginal US model (6) can be stacked in one global
VAR model that features a residual factor structure,





where et features weakly cross sectionally dependent innovations.
2.2 Identiﬁcation of shocks and impulse-response analysis.
Global shocks in our set-up are given by factors ft and the US innovations u1t. As mentioned
earlier, these shocks enter residuals ξt in the US marginal model, but additional restrictions
are needed if one wants to distinguish between US and foreign global shocks with non-US
origin. To accomplish this, we suppose that the US shocks come ﬁrst. Within the set of US
shocks, we aim to distinguish between a stock market shock, an interest rate shock, a risk
aversion shock and a liquidity shock.
We assume TED and VIX shocks come ﬁrst, i.e. before the money market and stock
markets shocks. However, a crucial issue is how we distinguish between shocks to liquidity
and shocks to risk appetite conceptually. We motivate the short-run sign restrictions we
impose to achieve identiﬁcation based on the literature of time-varying risk of economic
disaster and its impact on the business cycle and asset prices (e.g. Barro (2006), Gabaix
(2007), Gourio (2010)). For instance, Gourio (2010) shows that disaster risk lowers the
return of a ﬁnancial asset that is risky (e.g. equities) while raising the price, i.e. lowering
the yield of the relatively safe ﬁnancial asset, such as a bond. Accordingly, we identify shocks
to risk appetite as an increase in the VIX coupled with a drop in both equity returns and
short-term interest rates. By contrast, a shock to liquidity, i.e. a tightening in liquidity, is
associated with an increase in the TED spread, a rise in money market rates and a decline16
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in equity returns.3 Importantly, we impose these sign restrictions only on the response of US
variables, while no sign restrictions are imposed on the transmission of any of these shocks
to foreign equity markets and stock markets.
Finally, we identify and distinguish US stock market shocks from US money market
shocks by imposing the opposite sign on the response of equity markets across these two
shocks. An increase in US short-term interest rates should lower US and foreign equity
markets, while a rise in US equity markets should have a positive eect also on foreign
equity valuations. These sign restrictions are standard in the literature on sign restrictions
and has been strongly supported by empirical evidence (e.g. Rigobon and Sack (2003),
Rigobon and Sack (2004)). Our identication scheme is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of sign restrictions.
l1w u1w yl{w whgw ¯ ~w ¯ uw
VIX shock + .. .
TED shock +  . + ..
US interest rate shock +  ..+ 
US stock market shock ++..++
2.3 Data
Finally, we turn to the description of the underlying data.
Our global coverage is restricted to a set of 26 advanced economies and EMEs. These
cover 75% of world GDP and include relatively open and nancially developed economies. In
order to detect larger trends and results, we additionally distinguish between groups of coun-
tries, in particular between advanced economies (which excludes the US itself) and emerging
markets. An alternative aggregation is across regions, distinguishing between Advanced
Europe (euro area, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK) and Other Advanced
economies (Japan, New Zealand, Australia), as well as across emerging market regions -
Emerging Asia (Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand),
Emerging Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and also including Turkey and
South Africa), and Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico). Note that we treat the euro
3We are grateful to Vincenzo Quadrini for pointing us to this link with the literature on disaster risk
and business cycles.17
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area as a single economy, rather than taking its member states individually. Other emerging
economies have been excluded because of data issues.
All of the nancial market variables we use stem from Bloomberg and have a standard
denition. For money market rates, we use three-month rates. For stock markets, we
use MSCI country indices in local currency. We use local currency returns in order to
be consistent with the measurement of the money market rates, as well as to avoid that
changes in the comovement across equity markets results from changes in exchange rate
comovements. Figure 1 shows the data for the six regional groups: the US, Advanced
Europe, Other Advanced economies, Emerging Asia, Emerging Europe and Latin America.
Measuring risk and liquidity is more di!cult. As is commonly done in the literature, we
resort to using the VIX index, for the S&P500, as our proxy for nancial market risk; and we
use the TED spread as our proxy for US liquidity pressures. Figure 1 plots the evolution of
the VIX and the TED spread over time. We note that these are obviously highly imperfect
proxies for risk and liquidity; in particular as they focus on certain nancial market segments
(money markets for the TED spreads and equity markets for VIX). Yet we like the fact that
both are US specic in nature, thus allowing us to compare their transmission with that of
other US nancial market shocks.
As to the data frequency, our analysis uses weekly data. Using weekly, rather than
lower frequency data has the advantage that it should capture better the transmission of
shocks in nancial markets. Moving to higher than weekly frequency is complicated by the
non-overlapping trading times across markets, a problem which is reduced by using weekly
data.
Finally, we restrict the length of our data sample to start only in 2005, which allows us
to distinguish between a pre-crisis period - 1 January 2005 - 6 August 2007, and a crisis
period - 7 August 2007 - end July 2009. Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for the
dierent data series, distinguishing between the pre-crisis and the crisis periods.
3 Estimation results
We now turn to presenting the main estimation results from the global VAR approach. Our
rst focus is on the overall impulse responses across country groupings in order to identify
general, overarching trends and dierences, before we turn to individual countries. While
the rst sub-section present the ndings from the impulse response functions of the GVAR,
the second sub-section outlines the results of the forecast error variance decomposition18
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3.1 Impulse response functions
Figures 2-9 show the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) for advanced economies
and emerging markets, where impulse responses are unweighted averages across all countries
in a respective group. Further below, Figures 10-17 provide the GIRFs for the 26 individual
countries rather than the country aggregates.
The rst of the gures shows the GIRFs for the eect of liquidity shocks on foreign
equity markets. What stands out is that the elasticity of stock markets to liquidity shocks
has decreased somewhat during the crisis. This does not necessarily indicate that liquidity
has become less important as the volatility and magnitude of liquidity shocks has increased
substantially during the crisis - Table 2 shows that the standard deviation of daily changes
in TED spreads has increased vefold during the crisis; we will return to this point further
below when discussing the variance decomposition. Moreover, note that while stock markets
in advanced economies were less sensitive to US liquidity shocks than EMEs before the crisis,
the former responded as strongly or stronger during the crisis.
Figure 6 provides the corresponding impulse responses of money markets to liquidity
shocks. While money markets neither in advanced economies nor in EMEs responded much
to such shocks before the crisis, they did so during the crisis. And advanced economies’
money markets were more sensitive to such shocks than EMEs during the crisis. Moreover,
the eect of liquidity shocks on money markets appears to have some persistence as the
contemporaneous responses of markets in advanced economies are as strong as those in the
subsequent week.
Looking at the impact of liquidity shocks on individual countries (Figures 10 and 14)
rather than country aggregates conrms this picture, yet also indicates that there is a fair
bit of heterogeneity in the response patterns across countries. Another advantage of looking
at the contemporaneous impulse responses for individual countries is that it allows us to also
show the error bands - which underlines that our coe!cients are much more tightly estimated
for the crisis period than for the period before the crisis, in particular for advanced economies.
We next turn to the eect of risk shocks on global equity markets and money markets.
Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions of stock markets to shocks to the VIX. Over-
all, there is strong increase in the sensitivity of stock markets to VIX shocks during the
crisis - in fact the average contemporaneous eects double in magnitude during the crisis
as compared to the pre-crisis period. Moreover, the increase is larger for EMEs than for
advanced economies. Among EMEs, it has been in particular Latin American countries
that have become highly sensitive to VIX shocks (whereas Asian are much less sensitive).
Among advanced economies, it is in particular the European economies that have become
signicantly more sensitive to US VIX shocks during the crisis.19
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The impulse responses of individual countries to VIX shocks (Figures 11 and 15) pro-
vide a more detailed break-down by country, again underlining a signicant cross-country
heterogeneity. For instance, EME equity markets most aected by VIX shocks during the
crisis are Russia, Mexico and Brazil, while EME money markets most responsive are those
of Hong Kong and Singapore.
Third, the eect of US stock market shocks yields a striking picture. What is striking
is that the comovement of foreign stocks markets with the US market (Figure 4) has not
increased but even mostly declined somewhat during the crisis. This implies that while
equity markets may have become more sensitive to risk shocks during the nancial crisis,
equity market comovements have not changed markedly as this increased sensitivity has been
as strong in the US itself as in the rest of the world.
The picture is somewhat more nuanced when analyzing the impulse response functions
of money markets globally to US stock market movements (Figure 16). Here it seems that
in particular advanced economies’ interest rates have become signicantly more responsive
to the US, while no such clear pattern emerges for EMEs.
Fourth, the last type of shock we analyze is that to US money market rates (Figures
5 and 9). It again seems that advanced economies have become more responsive to such
shocks compared to EMEs, though the gures for the individual countries again underline
the presence of a signicant degree of heterogeneity across economies.
In summary, the empirical ndings thus reveal a striking picture of the global transmission
of the crisis, and highlight some crucial dierences in the way the crisis spread. First,
advanced countries were more strongly aected by US liquidity. Second, by contrast, EMEs
have been vulnerable mainly to risk shocks, and comparably less so to US liquidity shocks.
For instance, while shocks to risk appetite had less of an eect on EME equity markets
before the crisis, they induced larger movements during the crisis than even for the US
equity market itself. A third key nding is that in advanced economies it has been mainly
the nancing conditions that have been adversely aected by US-specic shocks, while in
EMEs it is rather the real side of the economy that exhibited the greatest sensitivity to US
shocks.
To some extent, the empirical results conrm some of our priors discussed earlier on:
EMEs were less aected by US liquidity shocks, possibly as they had nancial systems less
exposed to those assets that adversely aected many advanced economies. However, they
were more strongly impacted by shocks to risk appetite, which may in part be due to the
g r e a t e rr i s ke x p o s u r eo fE M E s .T h ef a c tt h a tc o u n t r i e si nC e n t r a la n dE a s t e r nE u r o p ew e r e
more exposed to deleveraging shocks in risk seems intuitive. Yet Asia appears to have been
relatively more sensitive to US liquidity conditions than other EMEs, which may in part stem20
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from the fact Asia has a greater nancial dependence on the US, while Emerging Europe is
more closely tied to developments in the euro area and in the UK.
3.2 Variance decomposition
After discussing the ndings for the impulse response functions in the previous sub-section,
we now turn to the results for the variance decomposition. As a general remark, an overall
increase in the sensitivity of a particular market to a specic shock does not necessarily imply
that this shock has become more important as an overall driver of that market. Similarly,
t h ef a c tt h a tt h ee ect of a US liquidity shock of a given magnitude has increased on some
but not all foreign equity markets does not necessarily imply that the overall importance of
this type of shock has not increased.
Table 3 reports the forecast error variance decomposition for US shocks on global (non-
US) equity markets. It shows the average contributions to the total variance across all
non-US economies in our sample, together with the contributions to the variance of US
variables.
Overall, three ndings stand out. First, US-specic shocks have increased in importance,
roughly doubling the share of the variation of foreign equity markets they explain during
the crisis as compared to the pre-crisis period. The same holds for foreign money markets,
though the US-specic shocks we identify generally explain less of US and foreign money
market movements. During the crisis, the four US-specic shocks we analyze account for
about 50% of the stock market movements outside the US.
Second, US liquidity shocks have become highly important for global stock markets during
the crisis. While they accounted for about 9% of the variation of non-US equity markets
before, they explain up to a quarter of the equity market movements during the crisis. This is
consistent with the ndings for the impulse responses of the previous sub-section. Although
the sensitivity to a given US liquidity shocks has not risen for all foreign equity markets, the
magnitude of US TED movements has increased dramatically (see Table 2). By contrast,
while risk shocks remain important, the variance of foreign stock or money markets they
explain has not increased.
And third, also the importance of movements in US stock markets and money markets
has risen for foreign markets. However, the share they explain during the crisis is clearly
dwarfed by liquidity and risk shocks.
Overall, the evidence from the variance decomposition underlines in particular the impor-
tance of US liquidity shocks for global equity market and money market movements during
the nancial crisis, and in particular for other advanced economies.21
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4C o n c l u s i o n s
The nancial crisis of 2007-09 has been remarkable in its global reach, severely aecting
nancial markets and economic activity in virtually all advanced economies and also emerging
markets. The objective of the paper has been to better understand the global transmission
process through which the crisis has spread. We have focused on two distinct types of shocks,
which have been emphasized widely as key culprits of the crisis: a tightening in liquidity
conditions and credit markets, and a severe re-pricing of risk and  ight of investors into safe
asset classes. The empirical analysis is build on a Global VAR approach, which allows us to
deal both with the identication of the shocks and their transmission, as well as with the
large dimensionality of the analysis for 26 economies and 2 nancial market segments.
The ndings of the paper suggests that both types of shocks have played a role in the
global transmission process. However, the ndings show marked cross-country dierences in
the global transmission. Shocks to liquidity conditions have been relatively more important
for advanced economies than for EMEs. By contrast, EMEs have been more strongly aected
by shocks to risk appetite than most advanced economies, with the exception of the euro
area. A second striking dierence is that the eect of US-specic shocks has been more
important for interest rates and nancing conditions in advanced economies, while in EMEs
it has been in particular equity markets that have been aected the strongest.
Overall, a key point of the results of the paper therefore is that the global transmission
of the crisis has been complex and cannot be reduced to a single dimension only. Of course,
the most apparent feature of the crisis has possibly been the liquidity and credit crunch it
induced. Yet, while this has had a major eect of advanced economies, for EMEs it was in
particular the rise in risk aversion and a re-pricing of risk that aected their economies and
markets. In turn, the fall of the global economy into a severe recession further exacerbated
the liquidity conditions and the retrenchment of nancial investors globally, hence inducing a
vicious cycle of weakening nancial conditions and deteriorating real economy developments.22
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A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Pre-crisis Crisis
avg min max std dev avg min max std dev
US variables
TED spread (rst di.) 0.002 -0.166 0.218 0.054 -0.002 -1.010 0.972 0.292
VIX (log and rst di.) 0.001 -0.278 0.565 0.118 0.005 -0.370 0.438 0.134
money market rates (rst di.) 0.021 -0.099 0.104 0.028 -0.046 -0.903 0.572 0.199
stock markets (log and rst di.) 0.002 -0.045 0.035 0.014 -0.005 -0.201 0.115 0.042
Stock market indices (log and rst di.)
Advanced 0.004 -0.108 0.062 0.018 -0.004 -0.248 0.153 0.041
of which:
- Advanced Europe 0.004 -0.108 0.062 0.019 -0.004 -0.248 0.153 0.044
- Other Advanced 0.003 -0.068 0.054 0.017 -0.004 -0.223 0.097 0.034
Emerging markets 0.005 -0.166 0.120 0.030 -0.002 -0.350 0.428 0.054
of which:
- EME Asia 0.004 -0.118 0.092 0.024 -0.001 -0.286 0.172 0.046
- EME Europe 0.005 -0.166 0.120 0.034 -0.004 -0.350 0.428 0.053
- EME Latin America 0.006 -0.103 0.074 0.030 -0.001 -0.312 0.186 0.052
Money market rates (rst di.)
Advanced 0.013 -0.160 0.203 0.030 -0.020 -1.572 0.900 0.136
of which:
- Advanced Europe 0.016 -0.150 0.174 0.027 -0.017 -1.572 0.520 0.141
- Other Advanced 0.008 -0.160 0.198 0.034 -0.019 -1.120 0.900 0.120
Emerging markets 0.003 -4.241 4.829 0.209 -0.014 -3.290 4.520 0.288
of which:
- EME Asia 0.014 -1.250 2.965 0.181 -0.024 -1.500 0.980 0.213
- EME Europe -0.005 -2.248 4.829 0.191 -0.005 -3.290 4.520 0.314
- EME Latin America -0.008 -4.241 3.102 0.311 -0.007 -2.458 4.188 0.409
Source: Bloomberg for all variables; see text for details.26
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Table 3: Variance decomposition.
TED shock VIX shock US stock m. US money m. Rest
Stock Markets
Pre-crisis period
US 24.34 37.13 14.73 7.63 16.18
Advanced (excl. US) 9.63 16.10 3.19 1.80 69.28
Emerging 8.23 9.24 3.47 3.13 75.94
Crisis period
US 33.57 14.48 21.32 15.59 15.03
Advanced (excl. US) 25.81 9.20 9.50 6.98 48.50
Emerging 19.81 9.76 9.44 4.66 56.32
Money Markets
Pre-crisis period
US 0.58 2.90 3.70 21.04 71.78
Advanced (excl. US) 0.67 1.96 0.22 0.15 97.01
Emerging 0.59 0.67 1.26 5.17 92.32
Crisis period
US 29.48 14.61 21.37 19.78 14.76
Advanced (excl. US) 9.73 6.20 4.20 0.89 78.98
Emerging 4.59 3.21 3.21 2.78 86.2027
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Figure 10: Contemporaneous impact of a shock to US TED spread on stock markets and
25-75% bootstrap error bands. Dark/brown bars correspond to crisis period; light/green










































































































































































































Figure 11: Contemporaneous impact of a shock to VIX on stock markets and 25-75% boot-
strap error bands. Dark/brown bars correspond to crisis period; light/green bars to pre-crisis
period.33
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Figure 12: Contemporaneous impact of US stock market shock on stock markets and 25-













































































































































































































Figure 13: Contemporaneous impact of US money market shock on stock markets and 25-
75% bootstrap error bands. Dark/brown bars correspond to crisis period; light/green bars
to pre-crisis period.34
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Figure 14: Contemporaneous impact of a shock to US TED spread on money markets and
25-75% bootstrap error bands. Dark/brown bars correspond to crisis period; light/green














































































































































































































Figure 15: Contemporaneous impact of a shock to VIX on money markets and 25-75%
bootstrap error bands. Dark/brown bars correspond to crisis period; light/green bars to
pre-crisis period.35
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Figure 16: Contemporaneous impact of US stock market shock on money markets and 25-











































































































































































































Figure 17: Contemporaneous impact of US money market shock on money markets and 25-
75% bootstrap error bands. Dark/brown bars correspond to crisis period; light/green bars
to pre-crisis period.Working PaPer SerieS
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